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RECENT CASES.
BANKS AND BANKING-CHARGING

CHECK TO DEBTOR'S ACCOUNT AS SUF-

DEBT-Defendant sent check on Y bank to
plaintiff for goods bought. Plaintiff deposited check for collection with X bank.
X bank sent it to Y bank for collection. Y bank charged defendant's account
with it, marked it "paid", and failed before money was remitted. Plaintiff sues
defendant for price of goods. Held, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
a defense of payment. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Perry, 2o S. W. (2d) 956 (Mo.
FICIENT TO CONSTITUTE PAYMENT OF

1929).

While the mere sending or receiving of a check does not constitute payment
of a debt unless the parties agree that it shall,' there is a point at which the
debtor is discharged from liability for the debt even though the check remains
unpaid. Thus if the creditor negotiates the check,' or deposits it for money,' or
deposits it to his account in the same bank on which it is drawn,4 the debt is
discharged. Merely depositing a check for collection does not constitute payment,' but payment to the collecting bank from the very nature of the case
would. It is at this point that jurisdictions differ when facing situations similar
to the present case. There is no doubt that the plaintiff's bank violated a duty to
him when it sent the check deposited for collection directly to the bank on which
it was drawn.6 In the Missouri case the court decided that where by such negligence a check is sent to the drawee bank for collection, that "collecting-drawee"
bank's only duty was to the debtor with whom it had contracted to pay checks
drawn on his account; hence it was only the debtor's agent. It therefore held
the money deducted from his account as his agent and violated a duty to him in
not sending it back as payment of the check. The loss, therefore came through
the breach of duty to the debtor and so must fall on him.' Other jurisdictions
reach opposite conclusions, maintaining that although by sending the check to the
drawee bank for collection the creditor's bank violated a duty to him, yet the
drawee bank is nevertheless an agent for collection-in some jurisdictions the agent
of the creditor;' in others, the agent of the creditor's bank.' These jurisdictions
'Stephens Eng. Co. v. Indus. Com., 29o Ill. 88, 124 N. E. 869 (1gIg) ; Baumgardner v. Henry, 131 Mich. 240, 91 N. W. 169 (1902) ; Loux & Son v. Fox, 171
Pa. 68, 33 AtI. 19o (1895).
'Kramer v. Grant, 6o Misc. io9, III N. Y. Supp. 709 (i9o8).
'Strong et al. v. King, 35 Ill. 9 (1864) ; Downey v. Hicks, 14 How. 24o,
249 (U. S. 1852).
' Oddie v. Nat. Cit. Bank, 45 N. Y. 735 (1871); Strong et aL. v. King,
supranote 3.
'Charleston R. R. v. Pope, 122 Ga. 577, 50 S. E. 374 (19o5).
l German Nat. Bank v. Bums, 12 Col. 539, 21 Pac. 708 (1889) ; Merchants'
Nat. Bank v. Goodman, io9 Pa. 422, 2 Atl. 687 (1885) ; Milling Co. v. Bank,
12o Tenn. 225, lII S. W. 248 (io7).
Page 957 of present case.
'Evansville Bank v. German American Bank, 155 U. S. 556, 15 Sup. Ct.
251 (1895).
1Hutchinson Co. v. Manhattan Co., 15o N. Y. 250, 257, 44 N. E. 775 (896);
Mackersy v. Ramsay, 9 Cl. & F. 818 (1843). See MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING
(5th ed. 1917) §§ 272, 274.
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follow the argument to its logical conclusion by holding that when the collecting
bank, which is also in this case the drawee bank, charges the check to the debtor's
account it has in fact collected the check just as much as if the money had been
handed over, and thereafter holds the funds as either the creditor's or the creditor bank's agent. The check being paid, the debt is extinguished and the debtor
absolved from further liability upon it." The latter view seems consistent
with logic and justice for the creditor's bank, though improperly exercising the
authority, has authority to appoint a subagent bank to collect the debt. Since
the loss comes from the creditor's bank's negligence and makes it liable to him
there seems little reason for placing the loss, as the principal case does, upon the
debtor.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO JUSTICE AND REmEDIES FOR INJURIES-

ACT RELEASING CARRIER FROm LIABILITY TO GUESTThe Connecticut Legislature passed an act providing, "No person transported by
the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such
transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

*

.

.

for . . . loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been

intentional . . . or caused by heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights
of others."' The plaintiff, defendant's guest, was injured by defendant's negligence; in an action for damages, recovery was denied under the statute. On
appeal, the statute was attacked as unconstitutional. Held, that the statute did
not deny equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Silver v. Silver, (decided in the U. S. Supreme Court, Nov. 25, 1929) IV
U. S. Daily 2494.

The legislature of a state may pass a bill abrogating a common law right
which the federal courts will not deem unconstitutional provided the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Federal Constitution are not violated.2
Legislation under the state's police power satisfies the due process requirement
of the Constitution if it is not arbitrary or unreasonable.3 Persistent exercise
of the right' abrogated by the Connecticut statute has, in the mind of the state
oPlanter's Mercantile Co. v. Armour Packing Co., 109 Miss. 470, 69 So.
(1915) ; Wells Oil Co. v. Marcus Oil & Supply Co., 221 N. W. 547 (Iowa
1928). See also Marine Bank & Trust Co., 115 So. 202 (Miss. 1928).
293

' Public Acts of Connecticut 1927, ch. 308.
2
"There is no vested interest in common law rights nor any constitutional
right to insist that they shall remain unchanged." Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 26o (917).

The Oregon legislature

enacted a measure identical to the Connecticut statute, which was held to be in
violation of the State constitution. However, the Connecticut constitution contains a provision similar to that on which the Oregon court based its decision,
which provision is present in almost every state constitution and is comparable
to the "due process" clause of the Federal constitution. Stewart v. Houk, 127
Ore. 589, Z7 Pac. 98 (1928), comment (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rv.696.
' Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct 357 (1885) ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct 273 (887).
'Note (1925)

nature of the duty.

74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 86, giving various state views on the

RECENT CASESlegislature, resulted in vexatious litigation, the elimination of which will so
expedite judicial business as to justify an exercise of police power. In addition
regulation of automobile traffic has long been recognized as peculiarly a problem
calling for this control.5 Looking only to the legality, not the wisdom, of legislation, a court will not inquire into the actuality of a purported condition forming
the basis of legislative action.' Although the foregoing theory satisfies the "due
process" requirement, the statute must further be found to have been enacted in
compliance with the "equal protection" clause before its constitutionality can be
upheld. If an evil exists in only one branch of an activity, legislation confined
to that one branch is not prohibited.! The only question of discrimination before
the forum was whether the statute favored drivers of automobiles to the prejudice of drivers of other vehicles. Resolving in favor of constitutionality on this
point is clearly justifiable in view of the purpose of the act to remove the evil
that the legislature determined existed only in the case of automobiles. There
would seem to be, however, some basis for questioning the constitutionality of
the statute in discriminating against non-paying guests in favor of other passengers. In maintaining the validity of the act in this respect, the state court 8
drew an analogy to the difference in the degree of care required of a bailee for
hire to escape liability from that required of a gratuitous bailee, in addition to
other analogies throughout the law0 There is, however, in the bailee relationship only a change in the degree of care whereas in the instant case the statute
entirely removes the duty of care; furthermore, the degree of protection afforded
prcperty rights is not necessarily the same as that given to human life. 0 This
at least is a step further, but the desirability of curbing fraudulent litigation
furnishes ample justification for such an extension.
CoNsTiTuTIoNAL

LAW-SEPARATION

GOVERNOR TO DIsmIss MINOR

OFFIcER

OF POWERS-STATUTE

EMPOWERING

AFTER HEAniNG-Governor dismissed

sheriff under statute empowering him to remove minor officers upon hearing,
subject to review by judge of circuit court.1 Circuit court reversed dismissal
order, holding statute unconstitutional as conferring judicial powers upon an
executive. Held, upon certiorari to state Supreme Court, that the statute is constitutional. State ex rel. Richards v. Ballentine, 15O S. E. 46 (S. C. 1929).
6 BERRY,AUTomoBIas (6th ed. 1929) § 3o, containing an exhaustive review
of the authorities.

'International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 215, 34 Sup. Ct. 859,

864 (1914) ; Mo. Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S.267, 269, 24 Sup. Ct.
638, 639 (1904).

'Carrol v. Greenwich Insur. Co., i99 U. S. 401, 411, 26 Sup. Ct. 66, 67
229 U. S. 26, 33 Sup. Ct. 692 (Igr3).
'The . S. Supreme Court was only confronted with the question of whether
or not there was discrimination in limiting the statute's effect to automobiles.
9,,. . . as for example, between common carrier and private driver, the
innkeeper and the ordinary social host." Silver v. Silver, io8 Conn. 371, 379,
143 At. 240, 243 (928).
Massachusetts has held an owner only liable to a
guest for gross negligence. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E.
(i9o5) ; Barrett v. Indiana,

168 (1917).
20

Note (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 86.

233 STAT. AT LARGE

997 (S. C.).
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The decision was reached upon the ground that the statute, for purposes of
its execution, constituted the governor a minor judiciary in relation to the hearing-and thus was not unconstitutional as placing judicial powers in administrative hands. Such segregation of office from incumbent thereof-holding a person governor in one respect and judge in another--though theoretically logical
is an unsatisfactory justification of the statute, since the separation of powers
sought to prevent the vesting of too much authority in any individual or group
of individuals, and this is manifestly not effected by placing the powers of two
offices in one person. However, the decision appears to be in accord with the
present tendency to disregard strict lines of demarcation between the powers, so
rigidly adhered to throughout the last century.' Development of new agencies,
scarcely heard of a century ago, has necessitated such bodies as the Interstate
Commerce and Public Service Commissions. These have been created for the
expeditious performance of duties peculiar to their respective fields, and each
embraces within itself legislative and judicial powers.' The pace of modern
activity has required such a change, and it is not strange that the several divisions of government, already heavily burdened, should also look to simpler procedures to carry out their functions. It is interesting to note that the makers of
our Federal Constitution saw no danger in vesting the appointing power of
minor officers in either the administrative or judicial departments,' and since
7
generally the power to appoint includes the power to remove,' it is evident that
they did not conceive of the latter as inherently either judicial or administrative.
The advantage of such a combination of powers is obvious; most cases have
held that the governor, under like statutes, is not encumbered by the strict procedure of courts of law,' and his findings of fact are conclusive.' The arbitrary
use of such power is checked by judicial review, which applies to questions of
'A necessary consequence of this view is that the Supreme Court of the
state acquires ultimate appellate jurisdiction, though not so empowered by the
statute.
' French v. Fyan, 93 U. S. i69, 17I (1876) ; Matter of Davies, 168 N. Y. 89,
61 N. Y. Supp. i8 (I90i).
'Pound, Executive Justice (i9o7) 46 Am. L. REG. (N. s.) 137.
"But we think it equally plain that the proceedings drawn in question here
are legislative in their nature, and none the less so that they have taken place
with a body which at another moment, or in its principal or dominant aspect, is
a court. . . ." 1rentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226, 29 Sup.
Ct. 67, 69.
'U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. 2, Sec. 2.

"In re Duncan Hennen, 38 U. S. 230 (1839) ; Parsons v. U. S., 167 U. S.
Tenn.
324,
1898).17 Sup. Ct. 880 (1896); Morgan v. Nunn, 84 Fed. 551 (C. C. M. D.
it rests with him to adopt
'Referring to the governor of the state, ".
that method of inquiry and ascertainment as to the charge involved which his
judgment may suggest as the proper one." Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe, go I11.
186, 205 (1878); In re application of Mason, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N. W. 570
As to the Interstate Commerce Commission, "The inquiry of a board
(1920).
of the character of the Interstate Commerce Commission should not be too narrowly constrained by technical rules as to the admissibility of proof." I. C. C.
v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 Sup. Ct. 563, 569 (19o3).
'Reagan v. U. S., 182 U. S. 419, 21 Sup. Ct. 842 (1goi); Longfellow v.
Gudger, 16 F. (2d) 653 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1926).
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jurisdiction and fraudulent irregularities. 10
Since in this country, contrary to
the common law, an office is not regarded as a property right,' no objection arises
based on due process of law. Thus it appears that the decision is a proper:
acceptance of the fact that such expedients ought to be held constitutional, if
possible, in order to avoid delays fatal to the proper functioning of our government, federal or state, and that the procedure chosen combines the advantages of
both alacrity and justice.

CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF A DIRECTOR TO PURCHASE STOCK FROM A CODi0croR-NONDISCLOSURE OF FACTS CONCERNING STocKc VA .E-Defendant, an
officer and director of X Trust Co., had practically completed plans for a merger
with the Y Trust Co., on the basis of which the stock of the X Trust Co. was
to be exchanged on an estimated value of at least $25oo per share. Without disclosing such fact, he purchased some of plaintiff's shares, plaintiff being a fellow
director, at approximately $1400 per share. The merger was later effected on
the basis of about $29oo per share. Plaintiff now asks for a decree directing
defendant to deliver to him the proceeds of his stock on said merger. Held,
that the plaintiff is not entitled to the decree. Connwlly v. Shummon, I47 At.
234 (N. J. 1929).
The above case presents a new angle to a problem on which the courts of
this country still are divided. In the purchase of shares of stock from one who
is not only an individual shareholder, but also a co-director, must the director
and officer disclose all knowledge which he may have pertinent to the value of
such shares? It is generally agreed that toward the corporation as an entity and
the shareholders as a body the director stands in a fiduciary capacity
Moreover
where the director and officer perpetrates an actual fraud by misrepresentation
in the purchase of such stock, the courts uniformly hold him liable to the vendor'
of such stock for the tort committed.' Beyond this, the courts are in conflict.
The weight of authority' holds that there is not such a fiduciary relationship
Funkhoser v. Coffin, 301 Ill.
257, 133 N. E. 649 (i922); McCarthy v.
Commonwealth, 2o4 Mass. 482, go Atl. 879 (igio).
' People v. Kipley, i7I Ill.
44, 49 N. E. 229 (1898) ; Mason v. State, ex rel.
McCoy, 58 Ohio St 30, 50 N. E. 6 (1898).

'Gillmore v. Gillmore Trust Co., 279 Pa. 193, i95, x96, 123 At. 730, 731
(1924) ; Hoyt v. Hampe, 22o N. W. 45 (Iowa 1928) ; BALI\NTINE, PRIVATE
CoxRoRATIoNs (I927 ed.) 358, 359. CLEPHANE, BusrNESS CORPORATIONS (2d
ed.) 225 (913).
IGeorge v. Ford, 36 App. D. C. 315 (ig1) ; Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill.
464,
470, 98 N. E. 941, 942 (912).
' For an extensive survey of the authorities supporting this view, see:
Wilgus, Director's Purchase of Shareholder's Shares (igio) 8 MICH. L. REv.
267; Smith, H. R., Stock Purchasesby Directors (i92I) I9 Micyr. L. REv. 698;
Thornton, Trust Relation Between Corporate Offlcers and Stockholders, Buying
or Selling Stock (igo8) 67 CENt. L. J. 452; L. R. A. (i916) B. 708, et seq.
Under this view, of course, the facts undisclosed were facts which the director
as a director owed no duty to the corporation not to disclose and were not facts
to be found on the books of the corporation and thus accessible to both parties.
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between the director and the individual shareholder so as to impose on the former a duty to disclose to the latter all information affecting the value of the
stock he may have gained from his official position; the basis of such decisions
is that since the director, because of his official position, has no control over the
several holdings of stock of the individual shareholders, that therefore as to
these individual holdings he stands in no position of trust and confidence. A few
courts' frankly recognize such a relationship and consequently impose on the
director a duty of disclosure of all facts in his knowledge as to the value of
the stock. A middle ground is supported by the Supreme Court of the United
States5 which, in effect, says: as a general rule, the mere fact that a man is a!
director in a corporation does not show that he stands in such a fiduciary capacity as to impose on him a duty as to an individual shareholder of the corporation; however, "special facts" may arise which, in addition to the fact that he
is a director, indicate that he is under a duty to the individual shareholder to
disclose to him any knowledge concerning the value of the stock before purchasing the shareholder's stock. By its very nature, no rule of thumb can be
promulgated as to what facts 6 suffice to bring a case within the operation of
the federal rule, but in general it seems that a controlling factor in any given
case is the extent of the control exercised by the defendant over the acts of the
corporation. In the instant case, the court followed the majority rule, merely
hinting as to its inequity," and either overlooking or disregarding the fact that
in addition to being a shareholder, the plaintiff was a fellow director of the
defendant. Whether or not the fact that the plaintiff is a co-director will affect
the various views indicated above is conjectural.9 It would seem on principle
that the mere fact that the plaintiff is a co-director should be insufficient to raise
any presumption of knowledge on his part or negligence in not having such
knowledge, for he may be only a nominal director, or may have been prevented
from active participation in the business by some good reason; certainly such a
'Dawson v. National Life Insurance Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929
(i916) ; Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kans. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904) ; Poole v. Camden,
92 S. E. 454 (W. Va. i916). Query: Would the courts supporting this view
apply the same rule to a director buying on the market from a broker acting as
agent for the shareholder?
5

Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S.419, 29 Sup. Ct 521 (I916).

The defendant in Strong v. Repide, supra note 5, was not only a director
but he also owned three-fourths of the stock, was the chief agent of the corporation in negotiating for the sale of the land in question, was acting substantially
as agent of the shareholders by reason of his large ownership of shares and by
reason of the acquiescence of the other shareholders, and moreover the sale was
being negotiated of the only valuable assets of the company.
"In the cases which follow the doctrine of Strong v. Repide collected in ig
Micn. LAW Rav. 698, suprs note 3, it seems as though the courts stress such
factors as the amount of shares owned by the defendant director in the corporation and the part played by the defendant director in the negotiations which are
concealed.
'The court in the instant case said: "Since our court of last resort has
adopted the majority rule, my own view as to which of the rules is the more
consonant with equity and justice is immaterial."
'The only cases which have arisen where the defendant has purchased
shares of stock from his fellow director are cases where there was actual fraud
by misrepresentation.
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presumption should not be permitted in the face of a showing that as a matter of
fact he did not know the circumstances nor could he have found them out by
proper inquiry. Logically under the majority and the federal rule, such a fact
should have little effect on the result;"o under the minority rule, however, the
courts would have to stretch to its utmost the doctrine of a fiduciary relationship
so as to extend it to a fellow director. In the absence, in the instant case of any
facts which would bring it under the federal rule the court seems to have chosen
the more logical rule although it does seem as though the defendant is taking
unfair advantage of the plaintiff by his use of knowledge received from an
official position to which as a shareholder plaintiff had chosen him.

CRIMINAL LAW-PARDONED OFFENSE OF CONVICrED CRIMINAL AS CONVICTION UNDER HABrruAL-CiMINAL STATuTEs-Defendant was sentenced for robbery as a second offender under Penal Code providing increased penalties for

second offenses. He appealed on the ground that he had been pardoned for the
prior offense. Held (one judge dissenting), that the pardon eliminates the prior
convicti6n as a basis for additional punishment. Scrivnor v. State, 20 S. W.
(2d) 416 (Tex. Cr. App. 1929).
With a constant growth in the number of states which have adopted habitualcriminal statutes providing increased penalties for offenders who commit felonies a specified number of times,' it has become extremely important to decide
whether the pardon of an offense for which a conviction has followed precludes
it from constituting an offense under these statutes. Few courts have as yet
been called on to settle this. question, but those in which the issue has arisen have
rendered conflicting decisions on two distinct lines of reasoning. One group
adopts the view that a pardon nullifies the conviction and excludes it from the
purview of the statute;' a second group, of equally respectable authority, adopts
the view that a pardon does not prevent the use of the conviction as a basis for
an increased penalty.8 In arriving at the former conclusion, the court in the
principal case bases its decision on the ground that the pardon expunges the
conviction and absolves the offender from all the legal consequences issuing
"0 Under the majority rule which cannot find a fiduciary relationship between
a director and a shareholder as such, it would seem more difficult for such courts
to find such a relationship existing between a director and a fellow director.
Under the federal rule, the fact that the man was a fellow director would affect
the case only in so far as it might offset the balance given to the other special
facts in the case.

IThe proposed act for Pennsylvania is treated in Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 798. It was enacted, with few changes, by the Act of April 29, 1929,
P. L. 373.
'State v. Martin, 59 Ohio St. 212, 52 N. E. 188 (1898) ; Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 39 0883).
'People v. Carlesi, 2o8 N. Y. 547, IO N. E. iii4 (1913), aff'd, 233 U. S.
51, 34 Sup. Ct. 576 (1914) ; State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221, 262 Pac. 62z
(1927) ; I BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (gth ed. 1923) § 963; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (ioth ed. 1918) § 1471.
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therefrom.' This doctrine is open to objections. In the first place, according to
the strict theory of the nature of a pardon, the convicted individual is guilty of
a crime 5 but surrounding circumstances justify a remission of the sentence.6
Under the American doctrine of the separation of powers, the executive power
to dispense with the execution of the sentence in those cases where the public
good requires it, can only eliminate the penalty and not extend to a declaration
of innocence that would nullify the judicial determination of guilt.7 In the
second place, the severer penalty imposed is not a legal consequence of the
transgression which has been pardoned but merely a severer punishment for the
subsequent offense.8 In determining the nature or amount of the penalty, the
court may consider any fact that shows the persistence of the defendant in his
criminal course, upon the principle that a crime committed by the habitual offender is more reprehensible than one perpetrated by a first offender.9 To consider the pardon as nullifying the conviction would bar the use of that offense
to show a criminal tendency and would defeat the purpose of the legislature. It
appears that the real reason for the decision arrived at in the principal case is,
as the court intimates, the fear that the opposite rule might in other cases subject
an innocent person wrongfully convicted but later pardoned, to enhanced punishment at a subsequent trial, notwithstanding his prior innocence. However, a
pardon is not a complete remedy in a situation of this sort, since nothing short
of an acquittal by a court can remove the stigma of guilte' Although in most
jurisdictions the power of a court to grant a new trial after conviction exists
only during the term in which the conviction is entered u some courts have a
complete discretion ifn granting a new trial if warranted, regardless of the time
that has elapse&' Where a court cannot expand its own procedure, the legislature should enact measures to extend its powers in this direction in order to
I This rule is to a great extent based on a dictum in Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 380 (I866), where the only issue involved was the effect of a pardon
in restoring to an attorney his previously acquired right to appear in the federal
courts. Three dissenting justices attacked the statement. Other cases have
cited this case as authority for the rule. Ex parte Grump, io Okla. Cr. 133, 135
Pac. 428 (1913).

1Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79, 35 Sup. Ct 267 (1915) ; Roberts v.
State, 16o N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678 (1899).

I The grounds on which pardons are granted are discussed in Barnett, The
Grounds of Pardon (1927) 61 AM. L. Rsv. 694; Bonaparte, The Pardoning
Power (igio) ig YAxE L. J. 603. The machinery employed is treated by Stoke,
A Review of the Pardoning Power (1927) 16 Ky. L. J. 34.
7
Mount v. Commonwealth, supra note 3; Roberts v. State, suPra note 5;
Williston, Does a PardonBlot Out Guiltf (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 647.
'McDonald v. Massachusetts, 18o U. S. 311, 21 Sup. Ct 389 (igol) ; State
v. Huneke, 138 Wash. 495, 244 Pac. 721, cert. denied, 273 U. S. 747, 47 Sup. Ct

448 (1926).
9
Graham v. State, 224 U. S. 616, 32 Sup. Ct 583 (1912) ; Kelly v. People,
u5 Ill. 583, 4 N. E. 644 (1886).
"oSanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 322 (1882) ; Cook v. Board of Freeholders,
supra note 5, at 333.
1 Saleen v. People, 41 Colo. 317, 92 Pac. 731 (I9O7) ; State v. Williams, 147

Mo. 14, 47 S. W. 891 (1898).

" State v. David, 14 S. C. 428 (i88o).
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rectify miscarriages of justice. However, the mere fact that a pardon may be
the only available redress open to the innocent does not justify-the court in the
instant case in deciding that a pardon exonerates the defendant from guilt where
it does not appear that his prior conviction has been erroneous.

DAMAGES-SALFS-OVERHEAD CHARGES

NOT

TO BE CONSiDERED IN COST OF

PRODUCrION FOR BREACH OF CONTRAcT-The plaintiff entered into a contract
with defendant to manufacture for and sell to the defendant a certain amount of
wood pulp, which pulp did not have a general market. The production of this
pulp was to constitute one-tenth of the plaintiff's total output. After part performance, the buyer rescinded. Held, that the measure of damages for the pulp
which was not yet manufactured was the difference between the contract price
and the cost of production. In determining this cost, the constant overhead as
taxes, insurance, and office expenses were not to be considered. Jessup & Moore
Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 At. 519 (1929).
By the general system of the common law, for the invasion of right there is
a remedy, and that remedy is compensation' For breach of contract, therefore,
the law would place the wronged party in the same financial position as though
the contract had been fully performed,' and to accomplish this in cases where a
contract to manufacture has been broken before the articles have been produced,8
the universally accepted rule is that the party in default shall pay the difference
between the contract price and the cost of production.' In the computation of
the cost of production, however, the great tendency of the courts has been to
include the operating expenses plus a pro rata share of the overhead. 5 This has
been due to the failure of the courts to differentiate between the accountant's concept of corporate profit which is found by subtracting total costs from total
receipts,' and the law's object to provide compensation for injury, that is, to
place the wronged party in the same financial status as though the wrongdoer had
'United States v. Smith, 94 U. S. 214 (1876); Bussey v. Donaldson, 4
Dallas 2o6 (Pa. i8oo); Ferrer v. Beale, I Lord Raym. 692 (Eng. 1701); i
SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) §§ 29 et seq. It must be noted, however,
that there are exceptions.as in exemplary damages, and where the amount of the
damage is nut ascertainable with sufficient certainty. Dowagiac Co. v. Corbit,
127 Mich. 473, 86 N. W. 954 (91o).
'Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S.
97, 40 Sup. Ct. 504 (i92O) ; Dravo Contracting Co. v. Rees Co., 291 Pa. 387,
14o Ad. 148 (1928) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1338 et seq.
'Subsection 4 of § 64 of the Sales Act, Pa. Act of May I9, 1915, P. L. 543
§ 64, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 19712 restates the prior law. WILLISTON, SALEs
(2d ed. 1924) 1433.
'Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Co., 121 U. S. 264, 7 Sup. Ct. 875 (1886);
Masterton v. The Mayor of the City of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 6I (N. Y. 1845)
(leading case); Winslow Bros. Co. v. DuPuy, 208 Pa. 98, 57 Atl. 189 (904).
'Rantoul Co. v. Claremont Paper Co., 196 F. 305 (C. C. A. ist, 1912);
Detroit Fire Proofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., I9o Mich. 275, 157 N. W. 8
(igi6); cf. Thistle Coal Co. v. Rex Coal Co., 132 Iowa 592, 1o9 N. W. 1094
(19o6).
'See MOXEY, PRINCIPLES OF FACTORY COST KEEPING (1918) 13, 63; ROBINSON & EGGLESTON, BUSINESS COST (i926) 4, 52.
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completely fulfilled his obligations.' The two are distinct, and, in rejecting the
rules for determination of corporate profit, and applying the principle that the
measlpre of damages was the difference between the contract price and what the
operating expenses would have been, the Court has raised a measure of damages,
the result of which will be a high degree of compensation! The validity of the
rule may be tested by either of two methods. First, to be placed in the same
financial position as though the contract had been performed, the manufacturer
should receive the amount of the contract less the extra expenditures, as for
materials, to which he would actually have been put to perform the contract.
Since he would not have had to pay any additional overhead charges, whether or
not the agreement was performed, in reality his expenditures would amount only
to the operating or current charges. Had the contract been executed, he would
have been in actual pocket the difference between the contract price and the
operating charges. To be fully compensated, therefore, this is the amount the
manufacturer should receive and is the amount which the Court awarded.'
Viewed from the second angle, the result is the same. For breach of contract,
the defaulter should be liable for the natural and proximate consequences of the
breach." It is cleary within the reasonable contemplation of the parties that
when a contract of this nature, to manufacture, is broken and thus removed from
the production schedule of the manufacturer, the overhead charge of the units
actually produced for other contracts, unless the demand keeps the plant at
capacity production, will be increased a proportionate amount. The resulting
reduction of profit on the units produced should thus be borne by the party in
default. ' Since the total of this increased per unit overhead when added to the
corporate profit on the contract is equal to the difference between the contract
price and the extra operating expense, the results of the two methods used in
computing the compensation are identical. The conservatism of the courts when
setting the measure of damages is traditional. The holding of the Court in
the instant case marks a distinct advance, and reaches a measure of damages
which is in accord both with principles of accounting and the doctrine of
the law.
"Supra note I.
'See Stevenson v. Smith, 82 Pa. Super. 539, 542 (1924) ; Huskey Mfg. Co.
v. Friel-McLeister, 84 Pa. Super. 328, 333 (1925) ; Morrow-Smith Co. v. Cleveland Co., 296 Pa. 377, 380, 145 At]. 915, 916 (1928). Contra: Morrison & Co.
v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319, (1861).
'In some jurisdictions, the risks incident to the performance of this type of
contract must be considered. See Masterton v. The Mayor of the City of Brooklyn, supra note 4, at 73.
"Globe Refining Co. v. Londa Co., 190 U. S. 540, 23 Sup. Ct. 754 (1902);
GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE COST (1927) 51; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1920) § 1344. In the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 353
(Eng. 1854) Baron Alderson held: ". . . the damages . . . in respect of

such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things . . .
or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties at the time they made the contract."
"See cases cited supra note 8.

RECENT CASES
EVIDENcE-ADMISSIBMrITY OF TALKING PICTURs-A talking picture of
defendant's confession was taken by the Philadelphia Police Department. At the
trial, the Commonwealth offered, against the objection of defendant, to exhibit
the picture. Held, that such proposed exhibition was admissible in evidence.
Commonwealth v. Roller (Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia, Pa., Nov.
26, I929).

The introduction of sound pictures to facilitate trial technique again illustrates
the willingness of courts to supplement, clarify, and authenticate verbal testimony
&
by tested scientific processes.
' Among the scientific aids heretofore admitted in
evidence are photographs,' enlarged photographs made by means of magnifying
lenses,' photostats,' X-ray skiagraphs and radiographs,' finger-prints' and palmprints," phonograph-records 8 and dictograph-records, and moving pictures
On
principle, since moving pictures and phonographs are sanctioned as evidentiary
media, their synthesis, the talking picture, should likewise be sanctioned. By
further analogy-, inasmuch as the film can be verified by the testimony of wit'Wigmore, Psychology of Testimony (908) 3 ILT. L. REv. 399; Wigmore,
Mozdng Picturesin. Evidence (1921) 15 ILL. L. REv. 123.
'Considine v. U. S., 50 U. S. 272 (190) (photograph to identify defendant); Beardslee v. Columbia Township, 188 Pa. 496, 41 At. 617 (1898) (photograph of place of accident). See (1912) 61 U. oF PA. L. REV. 337.
'U. S. v. Ortiz, 176 U. S. 422 (1899) (magnified signature); State v.
Knight, 43 Me. 131 (1857) (microscopic picture of drop of blood).
"Kurzrok v. U. S., i Fed. (2d) 2og (C. C. A. 8th, ig24) (photostats of false
revenue records); Moncur v. Western Life Ins. Co., 269 Pa. 213, 112 Aftl. 476
(1921) (photostatic copy of insurance application to identify handwriting).
'Chicago El. Co. v. Spence, 213 Ill. 220, 72 N. E. 796 (1904) (skiagraph of
plaintiff's body); Miller v. Minturn, 73 Ark. 183, 83 S. W. gi8 (1904) (radiograph of injured ankle). See (1916) 64 U. oF PA. L. REv. 524; (1924) 2 Nnw
YORK L. REv. 16o.
'People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1O77 (1911).
IState v. Kuhl, 4o Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 19o (1918).

8
Boyne City v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328, iog N. W. 428 (19o6) (eminent
domain; noise of trains reproduced by phonograph). See (1907) 8 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 306.
'State v. Minneapolis Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34, 144 N. W. 417 (1913) (record of conversation of illegal price agreement) ; People v. Eng Hing, 212 N. Y.
373, lo6 N. E. 96 (1914) (reproduction by dictograph of statements made by
third person incriminating defendant).
30
Algeri v. Cleveland R. Co., Cleveland Common Pleas Court (as reported
in Cleveland Plabidealer,May 13, I92O; personal injury; to disprove plaintiff's
alleged incapacity, a moving picture of plaintiff -t work as bricklayer was received by Hay, J.); (1925) 13 GEORGETOWN L, J. 195 (citing story in Washington Herald of Dec. 14, 1924; personal injury; detectives of defendant railroad
obtained films showing plaintiff playing on beach, when according to her deposition she was confined to her home and suffering from pain; admitted in evidence by Common Pleas Judge Hamilton of Los Angeles). See De Camp v.
U. S., ro Fed. (2d) 984, 985 (C. C. A. D. C. 1926) ; Pandolfo v. U. S., 286 Fed.

8, 16 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) ; Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 503, 181 N. Y.

Supp. 481, 482 (1920). In Gibson v. Gunn, 2o6 App. Div. 464, 202 N. Y. Supp.
19 (1923), the court excluded a moving picture on the grounds that it presented
irrelevant matter, hearsay and incompetent evidence, and was farcical in nature.
For discussion see Wigmore, Moving Pictures in Evidence, loc. cit. supranote I;
2 WIG!oaE, EvmENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 798; (1924) 2 NEW YORK L. REv. 96.
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nesses, and the subjects thereof identified by comparison, greater reason exists
for its admission than for either magnified microscopic pictures or X-ray plates,
which can be neither verified nor identified by the unaided human senses. In the
Roller Case, the Western Electric system U was used, of which the distinguishing
feature is the recording of the sound in the form of light waves on the edge of
the film receiving the picture. Its effectiveness as evidence is due to its ability
to reproduce, both optically and orally, the defendant's confession, or any other
fact in issue, in a manner not only superior to that of oral testimony, but that
of any other known scientific process.' Moreover, while there still remains the
possibility of prior or threatened coercion, it removes the probability of such
duress during the time of confession, provided the film is honestly recorded and
reproduced, and it may be added that it is more difficult forcibly to induce a
completely and apparently valid filmed confession than the mere signing of a
written one. In so far as forgery is concerned, it was testified at the trial'
that not only is the validity of the recorded pictures and voices determinable,
even by laymen, by comparison, but that an examination of the negative and
positive films by an expert would reveal any omission, substitution, retouching or
other forgery. Even if forgery were possible, it may be pointed out that photographs and even verbal testimony may likewise, and certainly more successfully
and easily, be falsified, and therefore the possibility of deception constitutes no
argument against the talking picture, while the greater difficulty, as contrasted
with either oral testimony or photographs, of successfully forging the sound
picture, is a valid reason for its admission as evidence. A more serious objection
is the spectacularity 4 of the sound picture, and its resultant tendency to outweigh, in the minds of the jury, other, and perhaps more important, evidence. It
is submitted that such specularity is due largely to its novelty, and will, in time,
disappear. Moreover, such prejudice as may be induced in the jury by the impressive presentation of the film's evidence may be counteracted by proper judicial instruction' as to the importance and effect to be attached to this evidence.
It is, of course, essential that the picture be authenticated by a witness of its
filming,"6 but it does not seem necessary, as was done in the instant case,"1 to
' Commercially known as Movietone. The other widely used sound system
is the Vitaphone, or R. C. A process, in which the sound is recorded separately
on a wax disc, similar in form to a phonograph record, and then synchronized
with the film at time of reproduction. Irrespective of their relative commercial
merits, the former seems superior for trial purposes. For description of both
systems, see POPULAR MECHANICS MAGAZINE (Dec. 1928) 938; (1929) 77 U. oF
PA. L.
REv. 295; Commonwealth v. Roller, Transcript of Trial 64 (Phila. 1929).
12
Ibid. at 61, IO5.

'Ibid. at 62, 68, 71.
1

Ibid. at io2.

See 2 WiGmORE, op. cit. supra note io, § 79o.

'1In the instant case, Gordon, Jr., J., charged the jury that the picture was
but a single part of the evidence, and moreover not the controlling evidence.
16 2 WIGMoR,
op. cit. supra note io, § 790; 4 JONEs, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926)

§ 1749.

a1Such testimony was justified in the Roller case, since it tended to show
that the process was trustworthy, and that the film was in responsible hands from
the time the picture was taken until it was reproduced in the courtroom. Commonwealth v. Roller, supra note II, at 73, 83, 89, 91.

RECENT CASES
trace the history of the completed film through the testimony of the technicians
who developed and printed the picture, since this is not deemed essential to the
introduction of photographs as evidence." Nor does it seem necessary again to
call experts to testify to the accuracy of the process," since the courts may hereafter, as in the case of other scientific processes, take judicial notice of it." It
is also suggested that a source of both fraud and duress will be eliminated by
requiring the recording of the film to be continuous without intermission.
Close-ups seem undesirable, since by revealing the defendant, and excluding all
surrounding circumstances, there exists a possibility of coercion. A consideration of the foregoing would seem to indicate that an affirmation, by the higher
courts,' of Judge Gordons decision, will do much to sustain the contention that
the law is progressive, and provide the trial courts with an evidentiary medium
of unsurpassed accuracy and realism.

INSURANcE-CHANGE OF BENEFIcIARY-AcTs SUFFICIENT TO EFFECTUATE
CHANGE--A provision of a life insurance policy reserves the right to change the
beneficiary but requires that notice of the change be filed at the home office of
the company, and that the policy be sent to the company for endorsement of the
change thereon, the change of the beneficiary not to be effective until this was
done. Insured, while sick signed a request for change of beneficiary, which was
forwarded to the home office of the company, without the policy, after the insured's death. This suit is between the original and the new beneficiaries. Held
(one judge dissenting), that there was a sufficient compliance with the policy
provisions to make the change effective. Hoskins v. Hoskins, 21 S. W. (2d)
io28 (Ky. 1929).
The beneficiary of a life insurance policy, where no power to change the
beneficiary is reserved by the insured, has a vested interest therein,' subject to
the terms of the policy which cannot be divested without his consent 2 Where
the power is reserved by the provisions of the policy or by statute,' the beneficiary acquires a mere expectancy,' which the insured may defeat at any time by
a valid change of beneficiary, which does not ripen into a vested interest until

"See 2 WIGMOaE, op. cit. supra note i0, § 794, 795; 4 JONES, op. cit. supra.
note 16, § 1752.
Commonwealth v. Roller, supra note II, at 55, 64.
"Wolfe v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 97 Mo. 473, 11 S. W. 49 (i888) (telephone);
Leone v. Booth S. S. Co., 232 N. Y. 183, 133 N. E. 439 (1921) (X-ray); Boynes
City v. Anderson, supra note 8 (phonograph). See I JoNas, op. cit. supra note
16, § 45i ; 4 ibid. § 1749; 2 WIGMORE, 10c. cit. supwa note 1o; 4 ibid. § 2581.
" An appeal will be taken to the Superior Court, which will hear the case in
the early part of March.
'Entwistle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2W Pa.

141, 5i At. 759 (i9o2).
2Preston v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 Md. 101, 5i Atl. 838 (I9oz);

Sangunetto v. Godley, 88 App. Div. 78, 84 N. Y. Supp. 989 (I9O4).
'Mo. Rav. STAT. (I919) § 6149.
Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E. 816 (1923);
Twyman v. Twyman, 2oi Ky. 102, 255 S. W. 1031 (1923).
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the death of the insured.6 If the right to designate a new beneficiary has been
reserved and the policy provides no mode by which the change may be effected,
any affirmative act clearly indicating the intent of the insured and the nature of
the change desired will effectuate the change.' It is universally held that the
insurance company may provide the method by which a new beneficiary shall be
designated.Z Such a provision becomes part of the insurance contract and a
change can be made in no other way.' This rule is subject to certain recognized
exceptions.' Where the insured has done all that was in his power to do, a.
court of equity will not demand the impossible and will treat the change as
effected.2' So also, if the insured does all that is required of him, and only a
ministerial act of the company is needed to effect the change, but the insured
dies before this is done, equity will consider the change to be effected.' The
decision in the principal case illustrates a tendency in some courts to interpret
these exceptions so liberally as to almost defeat the general rule that the method
of changing the beneficiary provided in the policy must be complied with?2
LIBEL-EXTRANEOUS FAcTs-KNowLEDGE op PUBLISHER-The defendants

published in a newspaper a photograph of one C and a Miss X together with the
words "Mr. C, the race horse owner, and Miss X, whose engagement has been
announced." The plaintiff, unknown to the defendants, was in fact and known
among her acquaintances as the lawful wife of C. Held (one judge dissenting),
that the publication was capable of a defamatory meaning, that the defendant's
'For a detailed analysis of the beneficiaries' interest in insurance policy, see
W. R. Vance, Beneficiary's Interest in a Life InsurancePolicy (1922), 31 YAIZ
L. J. 343.
' Carruth v. Clawson, 97 Ark. 50, 133 S. W. 78 (i91o). But mere intention
to change the beneficiary, though expressed, is not enough. Smith v. Locomotive
Engineers Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n, 138 Ga. 717, 76 S. E. 44 (i912).
' Knights of Columbus v. Curran, 91 Conn. 115, 99 Atl. 485 (1916) ; Hamil-

ton v. Royal Arcanum, 189 Pa. 273, 42 At. 186 (1899).
'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Tesaura, 94 N. J. Eq. 637, 12o Atl. 918
(1923) ; but see Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278 (i9o7), holding that a substantial compliance is enough.
'Most courts make no distinction between an ordinary life insurance policy
and a mutual benefit certificate in the interpretation of these exceptions. Voight
v. Kersten, 164 Ill. 314, 45 N. E. 543 (1896) ; Tepper v. Supreme Council of
Royal Arcanum, 59 N. J. Eq. 321, 45 At. 1In (1899).
" Isgregg v. Schooley, 125 Ind. 94, 25 N. E. 151 (i89o). A majority of
courts apply this exception only where the insured has done everything required
of him but fails to surrender the policy because he has lost it; Grand Lodge v.
Child, 7o Mich. 163, 38 N. W. 1 (1889) ; or the original beneficiary refuses to
deliver it, Jory v. Supreme Council, 1O5 Cal. 2o, 58 Pac. 524 (1894).
' Smith v. Locomotive Engineers Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n, supra note 6;
Wandell v. Mystic Toilers, 130 Iowa 639, 105 N. W. 448 (195o). But see Kempncr v. Modern Woodmen, 70 Kan. 119, 78 Pac. 452 (i9o4) ; Stemler v. Stemler,

31 S. D. 595, 141 N. W. 780 (1913).
'The court disregards the fact that the forwarding of notice and the policy
to be indorsed is made a condition precedent to the change of beneficiary. See
Note (1919) 33 HAv. L. REv. 114.

RECENT CASES
lack of knowledge of the extraneous fact making the statement defamatory was
no defense, and, the jury having found plaintiff defamed, that she was entitled
to damages. Cassidy v. Daily MirrorNewspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K. B. 331.
The peculiar circumstances abounding in the case seem, at first glance, to
render the decision doubtful.1 The dissenting opinion maintained that the derogatory inference, namely that plaintiff was C's mistress, was drawn not from the
language itself but from the fact to which it refers. The argument lacks force;
language can have meaning only in so far as it does convey ideas and denote
facts. Words are never interpreted in vacuo, and consequently extrinsic facts
are always admissible to prove that language, on its face innocent but capable of
a defamatory meaning, has ini fact conveyed such meaning.' It is for the court
to determine whether the assertions are reasonably capable of bearing the meaning offered in the innuendo,' but the likelihood of an innocent as well as aspersive interpretation being attached to the combination of wojrd and external fact
is not sufficient to withdraw the case from the jury Nor does the statement in
the publication that the fact is reported, asserted or believed to be true afford
any defense.' The implication of moral vagrancy to a woman in fact married
is a libel upon her, it being immaterial that the publication does not state that she
is married.' The absence of a direct designation of the person alleged to be
defamed, in the language employed, does not preclude a libel upon such person.7
The conclusion thus seems inescapable that the publication in the instant case,
'Plaintiff's husband told the newspaper photographer to take the photograph
and make the announcement, which the reporter did in good faith.
'In Morrison v. Ritchie, 39 Scot. L. R. 432 (19o2), it was held libelous for a
newspaper, misinformed, to announce the birth of twins to plaintiffs, they being,
unknown to the publisher, married only one month. But cf. Wood v. Edinburgh
Evening News (igro) S. C. 895 (Ct. of Sessions), where an advertisement that
a wet nurse was wanted at plaintiffs' residence, they being in fact married only
five months, was held to convey no defamatory meaning. A number of courts
have held cx fade innocent statements libelous per se, even though extraneous
facts were required to color their connotation. Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926); Upton v. TimesDemocrat, 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (igoo), where the reporter's dispatch stating
that plaintiff was a "cultured gentleman!' was erroneously transmitted by the
telegraph company as "colored gentleman!' and published by the editor as
"negro", plaintiff being in fact a white man; Flood v. News and Courier Co., 71
S. C. 112, 5o S. E. 637 (1905).
See Stutz v. Cousins, 242 Fed. 794 (C. C. A.
6th, 1917).
'ODERS, Lmir. AND SLANDER (6th ed. 1929) Tio. Where the words are not

reasonably capable of bearing a defamatory interpretation, the plaintiff will of
course be non-suited. McCormick v. Weinstein, 8i Pa. Super. 163 (1923).
'In Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty, infra note 9,at 792, Lord Bramwell
remarked: "I think the defamer is he who, of many inferences, chooses a defamatory one."
Waie v. San Fernando Pub. Co., 178 Cal. 303, 173 Pac. 591 (1918).
' Sydney v. Macadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., supra note 2. A publication
charging that a breach of promise suit was about to be brought against plaintiff,
he being, unknown to the publisher, a married man, has been held libelous per se.
Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N. Y. 2o7, 25 N. E. 161 (189o).
'ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 13o.
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viewed in the light of circumstances known to the readers, falsely, although
impliedly, asserts plaintiff to be a paramour.' The majority opinion, while not
sustained by the authority it cites, can probably be supported in its dissent from
the dicta in Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty to the effect that the extraneous
facts must be known to both the reader and the publisher. The action for libel
does not require the presence of any guilty intention on the part of the defendant; his words, either per se or with the aid of surrounding circumstances, need
only convey a defamatory meaning, reasonably so interpreted."0 Inasmuch as the
knowledge of those facts can color only his intention to defame, the lack of such
knowledge should be no defense," albeit the hardship here worked is greater than
where the statement is libelous per se. While the decision in the principal case
may seem somewhat stringent upon the newspaper business, the reading public
will no doubt profit in being able to peruse its future items of gossip with a
somewhat heightened assurance of their veracity.

LIFE ESTATES-RIGHT
CORPORATE

OF LIFE BENEFICIARY

STOCK ACQUIRED IN

TO AN

APPORTIONMENT OF

CONSEQUENCE OF MERGER OR CONSOLIDATION-

Trust estate owned 200 shares of the stock of A Bank which consolidated with
B Bank to form C Bank. The estate received 2oo shares of the stock of C
Bank in exchange for those of A Bank. The par values of the respective shares
were the same. There was no capitalization of any surplus. The book value of
C Bank shares exceeded that of the shares of A Bank. Life beneficiary of the
trust estate claimed that as a result of the consolidation and exchange of stock
an apportionment should be ordered. Held, that the consolidation and issuance
of stock was not such an event as to entitle the life beneficiary to an apportionment. Buist's Estate, 147 Atl. 606 (Pa. 1929).
There is without doubt a marked lack of uniformity in the decisions concerning the respective rights of the life tenant and remainderman of corporate
stock. Pennsylvania courts, basing their decisions on principles of justice rather
than convenience, have committed themselves to a rule of apportionment to the
life beneficiary of all earnings acquired during the period of the life tenancy, so
long as the intact value of the corpus is preserved. This apportionment, however, will be ordered only in the following instances: (I) when there is a dis'To charge a woman with being a concubine is libelous per se. Mooney v.
N. Y. News Pub. Co., 48 App. Div. 271, 62 N. Y. S. 781 (i9oo); McKinney v.
Roberts, 68 Cal. i92, 8 Pac. 857 (1885).
' This dicta was uttered by Brett, L. J., in the lower court, 5 C. P. D. 514,
539 (i88o), affirmed 7 App. Cas. 741 (1882). The court in the principal case
relies on E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones (ig9o) A. C. 2o, but there the statement was
on its face clearly defamatory if applied to an existent person bearing the name
mentioned in the libel.
10 ODGERS, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 4.
" Morrison v. Ritchie, supra note 2; Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, supra
note 6.
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tribution of either cash or stock dividends,' (2) a liquidation of the corporation,or (3) a sale of the stock.3 It is apparent, therefore, that before a life tenant is
entitled to anything in event of corporate merger or consolidation and a consequent exchange of stock, it is necessary to prove that there has resulted one of
the three above-mentioned prerequisites of apportionment. That there have been
no cash dividends in the principal case is self-evident. It is also clear that the
issuance of the stock of the new bank was not a. stock dividend. A stock dividend converts surplus into capital,' and where there has been no capitalization of
surplus a stock dividend has not resulted. The number of shares and their par
values being identical is further indication of no stock dividend because where
no additional shares are issued upon the declaration of a stock dividend the par
value of the outstanding shares is raised.' It would appear anomalous to assert
that a consolidation or merger is per se a liquidation. A liquidation of a corporation is the collection of all the corporate assets, the settlement and adjustment
with debtors and creditors, an& the apportionment of the amount of profit and
loss.' There was no winding up of the affairs of the bank, no gathering in of
assets, and no satisfaction and adjustment of its liabilities. All the property of
the original banks was preserved in the consolidated bank. There was rather a
continuation of the corporate enterprise upon a larger scale. Nor is a consolidation or merger a sale and purchase of corporate property.7 Where there is a
transfer of the property of one corporation to another, and an issuance of the
stock of the latter to the stockholders of the former in exchange for their stock,
a consolidation and not a sale is effected.! The exchange of shares, therefore,
was not a sale but merely "a rearrangement of principal and a readjustment of
'Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857) ; Packer's Estate (No. I), 291 Pa. 194,
139 Atl. 867 1927). See Evans, Calculating the Distributiom of a Stock Dividend Between the Life Tenant and Corims (1929) 77 U. OF P. L. REV. 981.
For Massachusetts and Kentucky Rules of distribution of dividends, see 2 PERRY,
TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 544,545.
- McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78, io6 Atl. 189 (I919).
See Dupont v. Peyton, 136 At. 149, 159 (Del. 1927). Contra: Bulkeley v. Worthington Ecclesiastical Soc., 78 Conn. 526, 63 AtI. 351 (i9o6) ; Wilberding v. Miller, 88 Ohio
St. 6og, io6 N. E. 665 (1913). But see R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Peckham,
42 R. I. 365, 373, lO7 Atl. 209, 212 (1919).
'Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 2o0 (1927) ; see note ('927) 76
U. OF PA. L. REV. 589 and cases cited at 59o note 2. See also Gist v. Craig, 142
S. C. 407, 141 S. E. 26 (1927). But see Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
298 S. W. 91, 97 (Mo. 1927).
'6 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1919) § 3684.
See Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra note 3 at 98: "The issuance
of a stock dividend is, in the last analysis, nothing more than an incident or
process in corporate bookkeeping. The important step is the increasing of the
capital of the corporation. The outstanding shares of stock are increased to
balance, either by adding to their number or raising their par value. (Italics
ours.)
'Lafayette Trust Co. v. Beggs, 213 N. Y. 280, 283, 1O7 N. E. 644, 645
(I915) ; 8 THossPsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 6551.
'8 TnomnrsoN, op. cit. supra: note 6 at § 6o13.
'Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Ashling, 16o IIl. 373, 43 N. E. 373 (1896).
In
order that it be a sale, the original corporation and not the individual stockholders should have received the new stock in consideration for the property
conveyed. Ibid. at 380, 43 N. E. at 375.
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9
the indicia of ownership". The circumstances in the instant case are similar,
therefore, to the situation of the retention of earnings by a corporation and a
resulting increase of book value, in which case, it seems, no court would order an
°
apportionment of the income to the life beneficiary.'

TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON TRANSFER OF INTEREST-EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMAN'S AcTs-James K. Young and his wife con-

veyed certain realty in Philadelphia, held by them as tenants by the entirety,
taking as part consideration therefor a ground rent. Young died in 1923, and
the United States sought to include in the estate which he had transferred the
value of the ground rent as well as of other property he and his wife had held
by the entirety, and so to levy a tax under the Revenie Act of 192i.1 Hold, that,
as under the Pennsylvania decisions no interest in property held by the entirety
2
passes on the death of one of the tenants, and as the federal courts were bound
the
tax
sought
to be imposed was a direct tax," and
by this rule of property,'
not being apportioned among the states, was unconstitutionaU United States v.
Provident Trust Co. of Pennsylvmia, et al., 35 F. (2d) 339 (C.C. A. 3d, i929).
Keeping in mind the nature of a tenancy by the entirety as essentially a joint
tenancy modified by the common law theory that husband and wife are a legal
unity, it becomes plain that no interest is transferred upon the death of one
6
spouse, that what the survivor now has she got under the original grant; consequently there is no occasion for a death duty.' So the courts have held in
every case of this kind.! And as the estate in Pennsylvania exists as above
described,' the correctness of the court's decision in the instant case cannot be
'Silversmiths Co. v. Reed & Barton Corp., 199 Mass. 371, 375, 85 N. E. 433
(igo8).
Cf. United States Trust Co. v. Heye, 224 N. Y. 24A 120 N. E. 635

(ii8).
" Gist v. Craig, supra; note 3.
139 Atl. at 2o8.

See Nirdlinger's Estate, supra note 3 at 477,

STAT. 227, 277 (1921).

Sec.4oi provides a tax on "the transfer of the
Sec. 402 provides that the gross estate shall
include all property. . . . "(d) To the extent of the interest therein held
as tenants in the entirety by the decedent and any other person, .
Title IV of this act (the one governing this case) has been repealed, and superseded by Title III of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 9, 69, 26 U. S. C. § io91.
2Citing Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 Ati. 953 (1912).
'Citing, inter alia, Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. I86, 20 Sup. Ct 873 (1900).
'42

net estate of every decedent."

' Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 47, 20 Sup. Ct.747, 750 (1900).
U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, Secs. 2 (3)and 9 (4).

'Under
8

Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39, ioo S. W. 1o8 (igo6).

' It is the power to transmit, or the transmission from the dead to the living,
on which such taxes are based. Knowlton v. Moore, supra note 4 at 56, 20 Sup.
Ct., at 753.
'See, for example, Tyler v. U. S., 28 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928);
Blount v. U. S., 59 Court Claims 328 (1926); Root's Appeal, 5 B. T. A. 696
(1926).
See Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV.383.
9
Fairchild v. Chastelleux, I Pa. 176 (1856) ; Stuckey v. Keefe, supra note
6; Meyer's Estate (No. 2), 232 Pa. 95, 8I Atl. 147 (igii).
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questioned. The contrary contention, that a transfer takes place "by operation
of law" by reason of the survivor acquiring such incidents of a fee simple as the
right to make a valid conveyance or mortgage" is sound only economically, and
is almost entiely without judicial authority." Yet the controversy may well
give the lawyer pause, and perhaps suggest the more fundamental question: has
not the underlying principle of estates by the entirety, the legal unity of husband
and wife, disappeared as a result of the Married Woman's Acts?' If a married
woman can acquire, own, enjoy, and control land precisely as if she were an
unmarried person, can she be said to be in legal intendment part of a marital
unity? Taking the view that she cannot, some jurisdictions have held the estate
to be abolished. But in most jurisdictions, the acts have been held to have no
effect whatever on the existence of the estate." If the position of these latter is
defensible, then it is probably on the broad ground that, ultimately, the raison
d'etre of the estate is to secure the home property against the incidents that
ordinarily threaten it, for example judgment liens against one spouse, or sales
on execution for a debt of one spouse: for in such case, by the nature of the
estate, the interest of the other cannot be affected during his or her H
life. ' On
the purely legalistic ground of unity of husband and wife, however, the existence of the estate seems no longer justifiable.

TRUSTS-CHARITABLE TRuSTs-APPLCATION op CY PREs DOCTRINE-A will
contained the following clause: "I direct after the life tenant's death the estate
to go to some Catholic Institution." Held, that the clause was void, as no definite beneficiary was named, nor was any person appointed to select such beneficiary. Chelsea Nat. Bank v. Our Lady Star of the Sea, Atlantic City, N. J.,
et al., 147 At. 470 (N. J. Eq. 1929).
In this country there is a great conflict of authority as to how definite a
testator's manifestation of intent must be in order to make a valid charitable
giftY Although the law seems to be fairly well settled for each state it varies
"Rights which by the very nature of the estate neither party alone possesses. Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391 (i871) ; Agar v. Streeter, 183 Mich.
6oo, i5o N. W. i6o (1914).
"The best statement of this position is to be found in the dissenting opinion
of Love, Member, in Root's Appeal, supra note 8.
"For an argument that it has, see Shapiro, Estates by Entirety (1913) 61
U. OF PA. L. REV. 476, 485 ff. For a general consideration of the effect of the
acts, see Note (1912)

12 CoL. L. REV. 539.

"Donegan v. Donegan, 1o3 Ala. 488, I5 So. 823 (1893) ; Mittel v. Karl, 133
Ill. 6s, 24 N. E. 533 (i8go) ; Thornley v. Thornley, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 229 (1893).
4 See cases collected in 13 R. C. L. iroi, n. 16.
"A policy set forth in Chandler v. Cheney, supra note 8, at 410 ff; as the
reason why the state legislature of Indiana left the estate unaltered while making
other changes in property law.
"Bruce v. Nicholson, io9 N. C. 202, 13 S. E. 790 (1891).
'2 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 713.
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among the several states from the rule of private trusts' to the rule in Englande
that courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction to provide for the execution of
charitable trusts in all cases where the intent of the donors to devote to some
form of charity is clear.4 When through mutations in circumstances it has
become impossible ' or impracticable' to carry out a charitable bequest according
to the expressed intent of the testator the courts have applied the funds to charities similar to those designated by application of the so-called cy pres doctrine7
The reasoning of the New Jersey courts when they have applied this principle
has been, that so long as the general intention is executed a deviation from the
less important specific intent is permissible.8 The courts are also influenced, in
reaching this result, by the consideration that public policy demands they favor
charitable institutions.' However, even in New Jersey, a jurisdiction categorized
as one where a broad application of the cy pres doctrine prevails,' the courts
have consistently refused to uphold charitable bequests where there is no named
beneficiary or means prescribed by which such can be rendered specific." The
courts justify their refusal to execute the gift cy pres in these cases on the
ground that they lack the prerogative power exercised by the chancery courts of
England.' But even though it does not affect the results reached by the courts
of that country the policy of maintaining the distinction between cy pres administration in the case of a specific and of a general charitable bequest has been
long criticised.' If the general intent and public policy are the determining
factors which impel courts to administer specific bequests cy pres, the same
reasons would seem to urge them to execute general bequests under the same
doctrine, with the additional inducement that in the effectuation of the latter
type of gift the courts in no event would hazard an execution that might not
'Trinity M. E. Church v. Baker, 91 Md. 539, 46 Atl.

v. Green, 13o N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880 (I89i).

1o2o

(I90O)

; Tilden

In New York gifts for charitable

purposes are now not invalid by reason of indefiniteness. N. Y. REAL PROPERTY
LAW (igog) § 113. Pennsylvania has enacted virtually the same provisions.
PA. STAT. (West 192o) § 2590. See (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 323.

'Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jr. 36 (i8o3); Ommanney v. Butcher, T.

& R. 270 (1823).

TUDOR, CHARITIES AND MORTMAIN (4th ed. i9O6) I8I.

"Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N. E. 839; In re Y. W. C. A., 96 N. J.
568, 126 Atl. 6io (1924).
5
Nichols v. Newark Hospital, 71 N. J. Eq. 13o, 63 At. 62 (I9O6); Atty.
Gen. v. Glyn, 12 Sim. 84 (1841).
'Doyle v. Whalen, 87 Maine 414, 32 At. io22 (895) ; MacKenzie v. Trustee of Presbytery Church, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 6i At. 1027 (905).

The principle -of cy pres is simply this: that when the charitable intention
of the founder cannot be literally carried out, it will be carried out as nearly as
possible. TUDOR, CHARITIES AND MORTMAIN, supral note 3.
'McCarrol v. Grand Lodge, 154 Ark. 376, 243 S. W. 870 (1922); Lupton
Trustees v. Leander Clark College, 194 Iowa ioo8, 187 N. W. 496 (1922).
9
Brokaw v. McElroy, 172 Iowa 288, i43 N. W. io87 (1913).
See 2 PERRY, TRUSTS, supra note I; 23 MIcH. L. REV. 430.

Norcross v. Murphy, 44 N. J. Eq. 522 (1888).
In this country the prerogative power is said to be in the legislature.
Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. I (1888). But see 2 REDFIELD,
WILLS (2d. ed. I866) 818 and cases cited.
" Lord Eldon, in Moggridge v. Thackwell, supra note 3.
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only deviate from but might be directly opposed to the actual intent of the
donor.' It, therefore, seems anomalous for the courts to base their competency
to act on the primary intention disregarding the hazard of an incorrect administration, and then to disavow their ability to act when a general intention is the
sole expressed intent. Since it is desirable for the courts to support charities
whenever possible and since the obstacles that obstruct execution in the case of
general bequests are procedural and historical, it is submitted' that courts
should not refuse administration in situations comparable to that in the principal
case.
" In the application of cy pres in the earlier law, courts did not have to fear
an administration of the funds that would conflict with the desires of the benefactor. Invariably, bequests were the price paid for salvation. Lord Wilmot
was justified when in 1767 he succinctly stated that one kind of charity would
embalm the memory of the testator as well as another. But it seems only reasonable that in this enlightened age a more intelligent selection of beneficiary
may be attributed to the donor. Willard, Il ustrations of Origm of Cy Pres
(1894) 8 HAI. L. REv. 69.
' See First Congregational Society of Bridgeport v. Bridgeport, 99 Conn.
2, 3, x2i At. 77 (1923).
Note (g27) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 310.

